SrI: SrImathE SatakOpAya nama: SrImathE rAmAnujAya nama: SrImath varavaramunayE nama:
nāsato vidyate bhāvo
nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ
ubhayor api dṛṣṭo ’ntas
tv anayos tattva-darśibhiḥ
To the non-constant (asat=matter) fixity is not; to the constant (sat=spirit) non-fixity is not. To Truth-Seers are known, the essential natures of both.[1. Rāmānuja tells us that this verse has no allusion to the Sathkārya-vāda of the Sānkhyās (vide, Sānkhya Sūtra I-78). Yogi Pārthasārathi writes: ‘What is here taught is, not the inconvertibility of nothing into a thing, but the inconvertibility of one kind of thing or category (viz., the ever mutable matter) into another kind of thing or category (viz., the ever immutable soul). …]
Of that which is ‘asat’, or body, it cannot be predicated that it is ‘sat’. Of that which is ‘sat’ or spirit, it cannot be predicated that it is ‘asat’. To Seers of truth (or Sages), the ultimate natures (anta) of both these postulates are matters of their definite apprehension (or direct perceptual matters of observation)[2. This means that the essential or substantial natures of these super-sensuous categories are demonstrably or by observation, known to Sages. They are as certain knowledge to them as sense-knowledge to us.].
Anta is literally the ‘end’. Here it means the ‘end’ of proof, or the conclusive end of a thing indicated. (So that the ‘end’ of sat and asat means their ultimate or essential natures).
The conclusion or certitude arrived at by Sages in this matter is that the nature of the non-sentient ‘body’, is ‘asat’ only (=inconstancy), and that the nature of the sentient ‘atma’ is ‘sat’ only (=constancy). Asat is thus that which is of the perishable character, and sat that which is of the imperishable character. Says Bhagavān Parāśara:
‘O Twice-born (dvija)! There is therefore nothing, even a little, – that, in the number of things, can at any time be said to be (sat) with the exception of the intelligent (vijñāna-ātmā)[3. Ibid; II-12, 45.].’
‘(What has been told thee by me) is that jñāna (=ātmā) is that which is (truth=satyam); everything else is that which is not (asatyam)[4. Ibid; II-14, 24.].’
‘That which is indestructible is admitted by the wise to be the highest Truth (paramārtha). But that which is derived by means of destructible things is doubtless destructible.’[5. IBid; II-14, 24.]
‘What would you call that, O King!, thing?, which by changes, etc., effected by time, receives not different signs (names)?, what is that?’[6. IBid; II-13, 100.]. And so on.
In Gita itself it is affirmed:
‘These bodies have endings etc.,” (ii-18)
‘But as for that, know it is indestructible.’ (ii-17)
Hence it is clear that what are indicated by ‘satva’ and ‘a-satva‘) are these (viz., ātmā and body).
The context does not here admit of this verse having any reference to what is known as the satkārya-vāda. For, the occasion indeed is one when Kṛishṇa has to explain to Arjuna – who is laboring under the delusion of not knowing the distinction between the natures of body and ātmā, – the perishability and the imperishability of these two (categories), in order to dispel that delusion.
It is to show this that the verse: ‘As respects bodies or as respects ātmās etc. (ii-11)’ was begun. And it is to further elaborate the same (subject) that verses:
‘But know that to be indestructible etc.’ (ii-17),
‘These bodies have endings etc.,’ (ii-18),
But how is ātmā’s (or the soul’s) indestructibility known? This verse[7. Next verse 2.17.] tells us:
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